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"Sí quieres paz, comprate una parabellum"
As described, a basic cockpit walk around, sounds are ED's generic jet sounds, the idea is to show the completely reworked cockpit, little to nothing is from the FSX/P3D version. On a next video i'll show it's functionality
AV8 (RAZBAM) Y OTROS DATOS NATOPS
AV8 (RAZBAM) Y OTROS DATOS NATOPS
AV8 (RAZBAM) Y OTROS DATOS NATOPS
Lo he puesto en el post del autocurso, pero para que quede constancia aquí también:
He actualizado las carpetas, repasado los permisos y esas cosas y parece que todo funciona "como debería".
De paso se está subiendo ahora mismo la carpeta 7 dedicada al AV8B, en ella podeis encontrar una carpeta de documentación en la cual hay varios documentos reales en inglés:
1º 00-80T-111-VSTOL Shipboard and LSO Manual (como tomar en un buque con el Harrier).
2º AV-8B-000 (el NATOPS del Harrier "Handbook").
3º A1-AV8BB-NFM-400 (las tablas de performance del Harrier).
Y otros dos que me han parecido muy instructivos:
4º AMW Handbook (Un manual de maniobras de desembarco, movimiento en playa, etc....).
5º USNavy-InstrumentFlightManual (Manual de vuelo instrumental de la Navy).
Saludos
Recuerdo se está subiendo!!!!!!!!
He actualizado las carpetas, repasado los permisos y esas cosas y parece que todo funciona "como debería".
De paso se está subiendo ahora mismo la carpeta 7 dedicada al AV8B, en ella podeis encontrar una carpeta de documentación en la cual hay varios documentos reales en inglés:
1º 00-80T-111-VSTOL Shipboard and LSO Manual (como tomar en un buque con el Harrier).
2º AV-8B-000 (el NATOPS del Harrier "Handbook").
3º A1-AV8BB-NFM-400 (las tablas de performance del Harrier).
Y otros dos que me han parecido muy instructivos:
4º AMW Handbook (Un manual de maniobras de desembarco, movimiento en playa, etc....).
5º USNavy-InstrumentFlightManual (Manual de vuelo instrumental de la Navy).
Saludos
Recuerdo se está subiendo!!!!!!!!
AV8 (RAZBAM) Y OTROS DATOS NATOPS
AV8 (RAZBAM) Y OTROS DATOS NATOPS
Del libro que estoy leyendo.... Harriers AV8B en tormenta del desierto. Interesante, con muchas descripciones de ataques y tal.
Further strikes followed on 17 January, and the effectiveness of these attacks was subsequently confirmed in a letter from Lt Col R M Barry, executive officer of I MEF’s 2nd Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group, to the Commanding General of 2nd MAW; ‘The purpose of this correspondence is to relate, as a matter of continuity, an incident that occurred in combat in the hope of recognising the responsible parties. ‘I was posted by the commanding general, I MEF, on 25 December 1990 as the commanding officer of the forward operating base north of Ras Al Khafji. Our command post controlled eight outposts manned by US Army Special Forces, reconnaissance Marines and SEALs.
Our mission was surveillance, reconnaissance of obstacles and enemy movement, and preparation for cross-border operations. ‘On 17 January 1991, hostilities commenced and Iraqi artillery began firing on my command post at the desalination plant, grids TM475572. I was outside friendly artillery range, and thus began looking for air support. The enemy had a 152 mm self-propelled battery at grids TM445632 and was firing flat trajectory into my position with effect.
At approximately 0930 hrs, two A-10s were diverted by the Air Force Airborne Command and Control Center to support me. The A-10s checked in and indicated that cloud cover and a briefed SA-8 threat were causing them to return to base. Essentially, they left me and my force without any air support. ‘Next, four Harrier IIs checked in and were “looking for work”. I identified the target and indicated that they were firing, and to look for the smoke. The Harrier IIs attacked the target with extreme bravery and aggressiveness, dropping 12 to 16 250-lb bombs, setting off all stored ammunition. They repeatedly attacked the battery, coming straight from the top dropping one bomb at a time for accuracy. Several hundred anti-aircraft artillery rounds were fired at the Harrier IIs, but they continued to press the attack, expending all ordnance and firing their internal guns. The battery was completely destroyed, and I could see pieces of artillery flying backwards into the air. Later, we took 11 prisoners – they were bleeding from the ears and noses, indicating their battery had been wiped out by aeroplanes. All their guns were destroyed and the commander had been killed. ‘I personally witnessed this, and would recommend that flight schedules be researched to find the squadron and pilots who dropped on grids TM445632 at approximately 0930 hrs on 17 January 1991.
Not only was it a superlative display of airmanship and bombing accuracy, but it took a lot of plain “old guts”, as the fire was intense. I feel compelled to chase this one down, as they saved my group of 34 combined forces personnel from further bombardment, as we had already sustained two-and-a-half hours of the same, and enemy accuracy was improving. ‘I would, at a minimum, recommend that Distinguished Flying Crosses be awarded to all four plots, as their on station time and attack lasted at least 30 minutes, and the overall effect was that the enemy rarely ever fired artillery in the daylight again until the offensive commenced.’
Further strikes followed on 17 January, and the effectiveness of these attacks was subsequently confirmed in a letter from Lt Col R M Barry, executive officer of I MEF’s 2nd Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group, to the Commanding General of 2nd MAW; ‘The purpose of this correspondence is to relate, as a matter of continuity, an incident that occurred in combat in the hope of recognising the responsible parties. ‘I was posted by the commanding general, I MEF, on 25 December 1990 as the commanding officer of the forward operating base north of Ras Al Khafji. Our command post controlled eight outposts manned by US Army Special Forces, reconnaissance Marines and SEALs.
Our mission was surveillance, reconnaissance of obstacles and enemy movement, and preparation for cross-border operations. ‘On 17 January 1991, hostilities commenced and Iraqi artillery began firing on my command post at the desalination plant, grids TM475572. I was outside friendly artillery range, and thus began looking for air support. The enemy had a 152 mm self-propelled battery at grids TM445632 and was firing flat trajectory into my position with effect.
At approximately 0930 hrs, two A-10s were diverted by the Air Force Airborne Command and Control Center to support me. The A-10s checked in and indicated that cloud cover and a briefed SA-8 threat were causing them to return to base. Essentially, they left me and my force without any air support. ‘Next, four Harrier IIs checked in and were “looking for work”. I identified the target and indicated that they were firing, and to look for the smoke. The Harrier IIs attacked the target with extreme bravery and aggressiveness, dropping 12 to 16 250-lb bombs, setting off all stored ammunition. They repeatedly attacked the battery, coming straight from the top dropping one bomb at a time for accuracy. Several hundred anti-aircraft artillery rounds were fired at the Harrier IIs, but they continued to press the attack, expending all ordnance and firing their internal guns. The battery was completely destroyed, and I could see pieces of artillery flying backwards into the air. Later, we took 11 prisoners – they were bleeding from the ears and noses, indicating their battery had been wiped out by aeroplanes. All their guns were destroyed and the commander had been killed. ‘I personally witnessed this, and would recommend that flight schedules be researched to find the squadron and pilots who dropped on grids TM445632 at approximately 0930 hrs on 17 January 1991.
Not only was it a superlative display of airmanship and bombing accuracy, but it took a lot of plain “old guts”, as the fire was intense. I feel compelled to chase this one down, as they saved my group of 34 combined forces personnel from further bombardment, as we had already sustained two-and-a-half hours of the same, and enemy accuracy was improving. ‘I would, at a minimum, recommend that Distinguished Flying Crosses be awarded to all four plots, as their on station time and attack lasted at least 30 minutes, and the overall effect was that the enemy rarely ever fired artillery in the daylight again until the offensive commenced.’

"Sí quieres paz, comprate una parabellum"
AV8 (RAZBAM) Y OTROS DATOS NATOPS
AV8 (RAZBAM) Y OTROS DATOS NATOPS
As described, a basic cockpit walk around, sounds are ED's generic jet sounds, the idea is to show the completely reworked cockpit, little to nothing is from the FSX/P3D version. On a next video i'll show it's functionality
Los despegues son opcionales, los aterrizajes mandatorios
AV8 (RAZBAM) Y OTROS DATOS NATOPS
AV8 (RAZBAM) Y OTROS DATOS NATOPS
No tiene ninguna relación.
El código para modelar el modo Aire-Tierra en los radares no existe todavía por parte de ED y por tanto los terceros desarrolladores o crean el suyo propio, como el Viggen o esperan a que lo haga ED para utilizarlo en sus módulos.
Por otro lado el AV-8B que está haciendo Razbam no lleva radar, no es el Plus, por tanto no puede llevar Amraams.
El código para modelar el modo Aire-Tierra en los radares no existe todavía por parte de ED y por tanto los terceros desarrolladores o crean el suyo propio, como el Viggen o esperan a que lo haga ED para utilizarlo en sus módulos.
Por otro lado el AV-8B que está haciendo Razbam no lleva radar, no es el Plus, por tanto no puede llevar Amraams.
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